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1049 
Understanding the Lobbying Efforts of a Church: 
How Far Is Too Far? 
I do not know whether all the Americans have a sincere faith in their 
religion,—for who can search the human heart?—but I am certain 
that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican 
institutions. This opinion is not peculiar to a class of citizens, or to a 
party, but it belongs to the whole nation, and to every rank of society. 
Alexis de Tocqueville1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The same song plays on the jukebox. It’s the one that comes on 
every four years or so, beginning with thundering from small-town 
pulpits, reverberating in media channels, even finding its way to the 
annals of various law reviews. But the tune dies on the lips of 
Internal Revenue Service agents; barely an echo can be heard in the 
federal courts. The tune of the § 501(c)(3) lobbying restriction may 
become a bit catchier if it were clear exactly what it meant. 
That clarity can be provided by understanding and then perhaps 
modifying the lobbying restriction on religious organizations that 
currently exists under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended (the “Code”). Such a modification to the 
lobbying restriction is both feasible and practical. Feasible, because 
courts have recognized the ability of government to restrict the 
lobbying activities of churches.2 Practical, because (1) a modification 
would provide a safe harbor to churches that are “chilled” from 
entering the political arena under the current framework,3 and (2) it 
would allow for better enforcement. Religion, as de Tocqueville and 
others have recognized, plays an essential role in defining American 
 
 1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 391 (Francis Bowen ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge: Sever and Francis 1862). 
 2. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th 
Cir. 1972) (“Tax exemptions are matters of legislative grace . . . .”); Branch Ministries v. 
Rosotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 3. Stanley S. Weithorn & Douglas F. Allen, Taxation and the Advocacy Role of the 
Churches in the Public Affairs, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND 
REGULATING RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 51, 57 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 
1993). 
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Democracy. But how expansive should that role be and what 
restrictions, if any, should be imposed?  
These questions are particularly acute in the context of politics 
because religious issues often arise in political situations. For 
example, the elections of 2008 included referendums on gay 
marriage,4 the adoption of children by gay couples,5 stem cell 
research,6 and limits on abortion.7  On one hand, what is at stake for 
churches is the preservation of the moral fabric of society. On the 
other hand, at least from a tax perspective, they risk the potential loss 
of tax-exemption status under § 501.8  
This Comment focuses on how to best address the tension 
between a church’s right to free speech and the potential for 
excessive entanglement between church and state through the 
lobbying restriction. An analysis of the origin of the lobbying 
restriction demonstrates that Congress has placed a meaningful 
restriction on church activities. Although a restriction on church 
lobbying helps prevent excessive entanglement between church and 
state, the restriction’s ambiguity makes adequate enforcement by the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” or the “Service”) difficult and at 
the same time discourages lobbying that would be beneficial for the 
church and society. A two-tiered approach—the first tier drawing 
clear lines to encourage some lobbying and strengthen enforcement 
and the second tier incorporating elements of the current approach 
to help prevent avoidance—is a possible solution.  
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of the 
lobbying restriction on religious organizations and how lobbying, 
 
 4.  S. Con. Res., 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); Calif. Proposition 8, available 
at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/pdf/prop8-title-summary.pdf; 
Fla. Marriage Protection Amendment, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/ 
initdetail.asp?account=41550&seqnum=1. 
 5. An Act Providing that an Individual Who is Cohabiting Outside of a Valid Marriage 
May Not Adopt or be a Foster Parent of a Child Less than Eighteen Years Old, available at 
http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/elections/elections_pdfs/proposed_amendments/2007-
293_Adopt_or_Foster_parent.pdf. 
 6. Mich. Proposals 08-1, 08-2, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
sos/ED-20_11-08_Props_Poster2_251561_7.pdf.  
 7. South Dakota Initiative 11: Abortion Limits; Colorado Amendment 48: Human 
Life from Moment of Conception; California Proposition 4: Abortion Limits. 
 8. Apart from the potential of retroactively paying taxes on the part of the church, 
donors to the church will lose the ability to take an itemized deduction for contributions made 
to the church. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006). Churches, however, are not subject to the 5% 
excise tax on lobbying activities imposed by Section 4912. See I.R.C. § 4912(c)(2)(B) (2006).  
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even in furthering a tax-exempt purpose, can violate the law. Part III 
evaluates whether any type of restriction on lobbying by churches is 
necessary, or alternatively, whether there should be an absolute 
restriction on lobbying. Part IV discusses whether the current 
framework applies the correct approach to churches. Part V evaluates 
possible alternatives to the current approach. Part VI offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND  
Many churches see the need to advocate moral reforms through 
government policies.9 But just because churches are not lobbying for 
economic gain, and rather are attempting to improve society, does 
not necessarily shield churches from the § 501(c)(3) restraint on 
lobbying. By definition, a charity that qualifies for tax exemption—
regardless if it is a religious organization—is not in business to derive 
a profit.10 Being concerned with making profits over the 
improvement of society would violate the exclusivity requirements 
for any charity under § 501(c)(3) whether or not it is a church.11 
Therefore, the argument that the purpose of a church’s lobbying 
should somehow shield it from scrutiny does not automatically 
differentiate a church from § 501(c)(3) entities organized for 
educational purposes, scientific purposes, etc., because all of these 
organizations are also not primarily interested in deriving an 
economic gain. 
A. Slee v. Commissioner 
A church might argue, however, that even though the non-
economic nature of its lobbying may not distinguish it from other 
 
 9. See generally Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements for 
Religious Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 2357 and H.R. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 10. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 2008). 
 11. A charitable organization must be “organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster 
national or international amateur sports competition . . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to 
children or animals.” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). “[T]he critical inquiry [into the purpose 
of an organization’s operations] is whether [the organization’s] primary purpose for engaging 
in its sole activity is an exempt purpose, or whether its primary purpose is the nonexempt one 
of operating a commercial business producing net profits for [the organization].” B.S.W. 
Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978). 
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charitable organizations, lobbying by a church is still permissible 
under § 501(c)(3) as long as it is in line with its charitable purpose. 
While churches disagree on whether lobbying should be permissible 
in any form,12 litigation shortly before the enactment of the lobbying 
restriction demonstrates that lobbying, to some degree, should be 
permissible. In Slee v. Commissioner,13 a taxpayer named Noah Slee14 
wanted to take a deduction for contributions he made to the 
American Birth Control League (the “League”).15 The League, 
however, had a declared objective to influence legislation, seeking 
“[t]o enlist the support and co-operation of legal advisors, statesmen 
and legislators in effecting the lawful repeal and amendment of state 
and federal statutes which deal with the prevention of conception.”16 
The League worked continually to further this political objective.17 
When the Board of Tax Appeals (the “Board”) decided this case 
in 1929, it sided with the Commissioner, holding that the 
contributions were not deductible because the League did not 
operate exclusively for a charitable purpose.18 The Board first noted 
that when organized, the League passed a resolution for “enlist[ing] 
the support and cooperation of Legal Advisors, Statesmen and 
Legislators.”19 Operationally, the court found that the League did 
not act as a charitable organization when it “distribut[ed] . . . 
literature seeking the repeal or amendment of statutes which the 
League felt hampered it in accomplishing its aims.”20 The court 
found that because this lobbying activity attempted to change the 
law, the activity fell outside the scope of engaging in a tax-exempt 
 
 12. See generally Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements for 
Religious Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 2357 and H.R. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 13. 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929), aff’d, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 14. Mr. Slee was married at the time to the founder of the American Birth Control 
League, Margaret Higgins Sanger. See Andrea Tone, A Medical Fit for Contraceptives, in 
WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 166, 168 (Mary Wyer et al. eds, 2d ed. 2008). 
 15. Slee, 15 B.T.A. at 710. The gifts were made in excess of $50,000 over a six-year 
period during the 1920s. Id. at 711. 
 16. Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 184 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 17. Id. at 185. 
 18. See Slee, 15 B.T.A. at 714. Indeed, apart from the exclusivity requirement, the Board 
also found that the American Birth Control League failed the organizational and operational 
requirement. Id. 
 19. Id. at 711. 
 20. Id. at 714.  
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purpose.21  
This practically per se restriction on propaganda imposed by the 
Board was not without merit. The Treasury regulations in force at 
the time provided that a charity distributing partisan or controversial 
propaganda did so outside of its tax-exempt operations.22 While 
propaganda has been defined as “the spreading of particular beliefs 
or opinions,”23 some associate it with an ulterior motive, or see it as 
an attempt to radically change the status quo.24 Thus, while there is a 
right to come to the foot of government with “‘entreaty, 
supplication, and prayer,’”25 if that supplication is viewed as 
propaganda, it will likely be viewed negatively. 
Addressing this interpretation of lobbying, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the Slee decision on appeal but qualified the Board’s 
decision. Judge Learned Hand stated that there are situations in 
which modifications of the law are ancillary to the furthering of a 
tax-exempt purpose.26 If the law holds an organization back from 
fulfilling its exempt purpose, the court suggested that lobbying 
efforts, within reason, could be used to change the law.27 As Judge 
Learned Hand noted in the case, there are acts by a charity, 
influencing law, that do not make that organization any less 
charitable; indeed, the legislation the organization influenced may 
enable it to become more charitable.28 
B. Senator Pat Harrison’s Proposal 
In the wake of Slee, Congress debated whether to modify the 
Code regarding charitable organizations. In March of 1934, the 
 
 21. Id. at 715. The court found that the League engaged in propaganda, and that 
“[t]he dissemination of propaganda is usually thought of, not as a charitable, religious, or 
educational program, but primarily to accomplish the purpose of the person instigating it, 
which purpose here was a change or repeal of statutes.” Id. Note that starting in 1919  
regulations issued by the Treasury Department specified that partisan propaganda did not fall 
within the activities sanctioned by the tax-exempt statute. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 
1133, 1140 (Ct. Cl. 1974). 
 22. Slee, 15 B.T.A. at 715. 
 23. Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1955). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. (quoting John Quincy Adams) 
 26. Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[T]here are many charitable, 
literary and scientific ventures that as an incident to their success require changes in the law. . . 
. [A charity] does not lose its character when it seeks to strengthen its arm.”). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
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Senate Finance Committee met to discuss H.R. 7835. During the 
morning of March 21, Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison moved that 
there should be “no deductions from gross income . . . in the case of 
contributions made to organizations carrying on propaganda, 
attempting to influence legislation or participating in partisan 
politics.”29 The Committee approved Senator Harrison’s provision 
without a vote.30 
As originally enacted, the provision provided that the income tax 
should not apply “to any corporation or association organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational 
purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of 
any private stockholder or individual . . . .”31 The Committee 
incorporated Senator Harrison’s provision after the word 
“individual” so that the language presented before the Senate on 
April 2, 1934 added the words “and no substantial part of the 
activities of which is participation in partisan politics or is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.”32  
Although Slee purportedly precipitated the legislation,33 the 
Congressional Record does not reflect an intent to distinguish 
between acceptable and harmful lobbying. Senator Harrison stated,  
“[T]he attention of the Senate committee was called to the fact that 
there [were] certain organizations which [were] receiving 
contributions in order to influence legislation and carry on 
propaganda.”34 An exclusive focus on Mr. Harrison’s remarks may 
suggest that since the provision did not result from a concern about 
church lobbying activities, the provision was not intended to prohibit 
 
 29. The Internal Revenue Act of 1934: Hearing on H.R. 7835 Before the S. Finance 
Comm., 73d Cong. 112 (1934). 
 30. Id. 
 31. An Act to Reduce Tariff Duties and to Provide Revenue for the Government, and 
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 172 (1913). 
 32. 73 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934). 
 33. See, e.g., Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (Ct. Cl. 1974). 
 34. 73 CONG. REC. 5,959 (1934) (“I may say to the Senate that the attention of the 
Senate committee was called to the fact that there are certain organizations which are receiving 
contributions in order to influence legislation and carry on propaganda.”). Wisconsin Senator 
Robert La Follette tried to go further, suggesting that while he understood that Congress 
wanted, in some cases, to encourage contributions, the allowance of a tax deduction does “not 
make a penny’s worth of difference” in what a person contributes. Id.  In his judgment, the 
government could “never . . . get away from mistakes of administration and from decisions 
which may seem like favoritism until all contributions to organizations of this kind are made 
subject to the income tax.” Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009  10:07 AM 
1049 Understanding the Lobbying Efforts of a Church 
 1055 
lobbying by churches.  
The Congressional Record also shows, however, that the Senate 
expressed no concern for churches when evaluating the adverse 
effects that result from the provision. The Senate Finance Committee 
had concerns that the scope of the remedy would be greater than the 
problem and, consequently, worried that the provision would 
adversely affect activities by organizations that did not warrant 
concern.35 But the concern manifested on the Senate floor did not 
center on or even mention churches. Rather, the concern focused on 
organizations that had a direct reliance on legislation to advance 
their charitable cause, such as the Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals.36 
Churches thus cannot necessarily rely on the purpose of the 
provision as a possible shield from the application of the lobbying 
restriction. Further, a plain reading of the statute does not 
differentiate between churches and other charitable organizations. A 
church, using Slee, may try to argue that the provision only applies to 
lobbying that is not in furtherance of its tax-exempt purpose.37 This 
argument must fail, however, or else the lobbying restriction would 
be no different than the exclusivity requirement found under § 
501(c)(3). 
Under the exclusivity requirement, a church must “operate[] 
exclusively for religious . . . purposes.”38 The regulations clarify that 
exclusively does not mean that a charity cannot engage in a non tax-
exempt activity. Rather, a charity will be regarded as operating 
exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose as long as any of its activities 
that are not in furtherance of an exempt purpose are insubstantial.39 
The lobbying restriction of § 501(c)(3) has a similar substantiality 
requirement. The lobbying restriction provides that “no substantial 
part of the [church’s] activities . . . [involves] carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . .”40 
 
 35. Pennsylvania Senator David Reed acknowledged that the “amendment goes much 
further than the committee intended it to go.” 73 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Or, in other words, lobbying that is in furtherance of a private interest rather than a 
public interest. See Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1955). 
 38. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 39. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008). 
 40. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
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Since both restrictions have a substantiality requirement, if the 
lobbying restriction only applied to activities not in line with a tax-
exempt purpose, the only way a charity could violate the lobbying 
restriction would be to become substantially involved in legislation 
that would be for a benefit other than a charitable purpose. If the 
lobbying restriction only applied to activities not in line with a tax-
exempt purpose, however, it would be redundant of the exclusivity 
requirement.41 
Interpreting the lobbying restriction to apply to activities 
furthering a tax-exempt purpose, which avoids redundancy of the 
exclusivity requirement, is supported by the legislative history of the 
provision and by the judiciary.42 The enactors of the provision 
realized the scope of the provision would militate against action 
taken to further a tax-exempt purpose.43 Although selfish motivation 
could violate the restriction, an organization does not apparently 
need to have a selfish motive for a violation to occur.44 
III. TO LOBBY OR NOT TO LOBBY 
The legislative history demonstrates that a concern of the reach 
of the substantiality requirement did not include the effect on 
churches. Although the provision currently can reach churches, the 
question remains whether the provision should restrict churches, and 
if so, by how much. A look at the extremes—the use of no restriction 
 
 41. Thus a church arguing the point in court would most certainly lose, since courts 
construe the language of a statute to avoid redundancy. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 
U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
 42. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th 
Cir. 1972) (“A religious organization that engages in substantial activity aimed at influencing 
legislation is disqualified from tax exemption, whatever the motivation.”). 
 43. While the committee wanted to address the issue of selfish contributions—those 
contributions that would advance the personal interests of the giver—it realized that the scope 
of the proposal went further. 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934). While there was discussion about 
rewording the provision, see Senator Reed’s comment at 78 CONG. REC. 5,959 (1934), no 
meaningful revision was made. 
 44. In response to Senator Couzens’ statement that the activities of the children’s 
welfare societies could not be prohibited from lobbying, Senator Reed responded that he was 
“not so sure. Take the case of those who are urging the adoption of the child-labor 
amendment: Certainly they are not acting from selfish motives, and yet almost their entire 
activity is an effort to influence legislation.” 78 CONG. REC. 5,861; see also Haswell v. United 
States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (citing Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. 
United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1972)) (“An organization that engages in 
substantial activity aimed at influencing legislation is disqualified from a tax exemption, 
whatever the motivation.”). 
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or the use of an absolute restriction—suggests that a middle path 
that improves on the current approach would be best.  
A. Evaluating Unfettered Lobbying 
One option available to address any ambiguity under the current 
standard is to not have a lobbying restriction on churches at all. This 
approach would be a return to the treatment of churches by the 
Code for almost thirty years at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. This approach, however, fails to overcome two valid 
concerns: (1) the formation of churches in name only to funnel tax-
free money into lobbying efforts and (2) the detrimental effect to 
legitimate churches if separation between church and state is 
impaired.45 The formation of sham churches for the primary purpose 
of influencing legislation is a practical consideration that must be 
addressed to avoid revenue shortfall and other abuses, whereas the 
separation of church and state is more of a theoretical consideration 
that must be addressed to incorporate constitutional requirements.  
Despite these concerns, some churches feel that unfettered lobbying 
benefits both the church and the nation. On the other hand, the 
historical context of church and state in the United States suggests 
that unfettered lobbying is inappropriate. 
1. The rise of the religious right 
There is a difference between speaking out on moral issues and 
using legislation as a vehicle to change the moral landscape of the 
United States. While political viewpoints and religious values often 
overlap, the political arena is not the sole option to propagate a 
belief in a higher existence and to address moral decay. In fact, many 
churches have chosen to refrain from politics altogether. For 
example, during the twentieth century, many churches, which have 
always had a strong moral voice, have only recently re-emerged with 
a strong political voice.46 Jerry Falwell reflected the common view of 
 
 45. Further, it should be noted that a vast majority of religious leaders purportedly 
oppose influencing politics, at least when it comes to endorsing political candidates. Review of 
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements for Religious Organizations: Hearing on 
H.R. 2357 and H.R. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 107th Cong. 39–41 (2002) (statement of Reverend C. Welton Gaddy, Executive 
Director, Interfaith Alliance) (stating that a Gallup/Interfaith Alliance Foundation poll found 
that 77% of religious leaders did not approve of the supporting of political candidates). 
 46. See PATRICK ALLITT, RELIGION IN AMERICA SINCE 1945: A HISTORY 154 (2003) 
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pre-1970s Baptist preachers when he stated that “[p]reachers are not 
called to be politicians but to be soul winners.”47 
But this hands-off approach soon gave way to an attitude of 
“[g]et them saved, baptized, and registered,”48 as Falwell and others 
suddenly saw politics as a means to address the moral ills of a 
nation—a concern that in their eyes outweighed the need for 
separation of church and state.49 Accordingly, Christian lobbying 
groups began to spring up, such as Christian Voice and Moral 
Majority.50 The Moral Majority and other groups, in turn, created 
political action committees, which funded the campaigns of various 
conservative lawmakers.51 
2. The Founders and the Court 
From the inception of this nation, both the public and the 
Founders thought that the state should not get involved with 
directing the spiritual affairs of the populace.52  What is not as clear, 
however, is the ability of churches to lobby for the government to 
interfere “civilly,”53 through social programs such as faith-based 
initiatives. A look back at the historical relationship between 
 
(stating that Christians started to flex political muscles in the 1970s after a half century of 
being withdrawn); see also Paul Boyer, The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American 
Protestantism, in RIGHTWARD BOUND 29, 33 (Bruce J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 
2008) (“Pre-1970s evangelicals, focused on evangelism and denominational concerns, 
generally avoided overt political involvement.”). In the 1960s, for example, the traditional 
Baptist principle was to focus on preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ and to ignore direct 
involvement in issues such as civil rights reform. See ALLITT, supra at 151. 
 47. Boyer, supra note 46, at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 48. Id. at 35, 44 (emphasis added). 
 49. The phrase “separation between Church and State” originated in a letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 1 (2002) (“‘I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of 
separation between Church & State.’”). 
 50. See ALLITT, supra note 46, at 152; KAREN O’CONNER, NO NEUTRAL GROUND?: 
ABORTION POLITICS IN AN AGE OF ABSOLUTES 83 (1996). 
 51. See O’CONNER, supra note 50, at 82–83. 
 52. JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO 
CENTURIES 137 (2008). 
 53. For a discussion concerning the distinction between spiritual and civil involvement 
of government following the Revolutionary War, see id. at 126–33, 153–55 (contrasting the 
view of some that civil involvement was a backdoor to establishing religion with the view of 
others that by opposing civil involvement, protestors were mistaking “‘their purses for their 
consciences’”). 
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churches and politics, as well as the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of that relationship, provides the background for understanding that 
some limitations should be imposed. 
Some of the Founders believed that this civil element of the 
separation of church and state would not only benefit the state but 
would also be to the overall benefit of the freedom of religious 
conscience.54 One controversial aspect of state government 
involvement was the use of taxes to support religions. This practice 
continued into the beginning of the nineteenth century, despite the 
concerns of its impact by many around the country.55 One such tax, 
or general assessment, was proposed by Patrick Henry in 1784.56 
The assessment did not seek to establish a certain religion. Instead, 
the assessment sought to benefit all churches in a jurisdiction and 
gave citizens the option of choosing the institution or, in the 
alternative, the public education fund.57 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison opposed such taxes; 
Jefferson expressing his views in, “An Act for Establishing Religious 
Freedom,” and Madison in, “Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments.”58 Madison asserts fifteen arguments against 
the allowance, including a protection of liberty argument and an 
equality argument. Although the assessment would supposedly apply 
to all Christian denominations, Madison still saw danger, asking, 
“[w]ho does not see that the same authority which can establish 
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with 
the same ease any particular sect of Christians.”59 Madison also 
 
 54. See Steven Waldman, Why I’m Celebrating Madison’s Birthday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
16, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123714297334033741. Note, 
however, that venerable American figures such as George Washington and James Monroe 
opposed the idea of separation of church and state. Joy Hakim, A Forgotten Fight for Religious 
Freedom, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1985, at 1. Washington, however, eventually opposed such 
measures as a general assessment (i.e., tax to support religion). HUTSON, supra note 52, at 
136. 
 55. Massachusetts became the last state to outlaw the practice, abolishing the tax in 
1833. HUTSON, supra note 52, at 166. 
 56. Id. at 117–18. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Waldman, supra note 54. 
 59. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: COMPRISING HIS 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND 
DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED: VOLUME II 1783–1787, at 186 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., Putnam 1901). 
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thought that the proposed law violated freedom of conscience: 
“Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and 
to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we 
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not 
yielded to the evidence which has convinced us.”60 
While the Madison and Jefferson view was not widely espoused 
by the populace at the end of the eighteenth century,61 the Supreme 
Court has treated their view as such and consequently has restricted 
the ability of government to intervene in the non-spiritual aspect of 
religion in the United States.62 The Court, in Everson v. Board of 
Education, stated that the “establishment of religion” clause of the 
First Amendment not only means that “[n]either a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church[,]”63 but also means that 
neither state nor the Federal Government “can pass laws which aid 
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”64 
Apart from the consideration of the subject by the Supreme 
Court, there are practical examples of the dangers of letting religion 
have too much influence in political affairs. As a result of religious 
influence on politics, various countries have recognized the validity 
of one religion to the detriment or other religions.65 
B. Evaluating an Absolute Restriction 
A complete prohibition against church lobbying, however, would 
also be undesirable. Just as there is a concern of religion having too 
much influence in politics, there is, of course, the related concern of 
general government oversight of religion;66 the government would 
have to monitor church affairs to evaluate whether there is 
compliance with the prohibition. While interaction between 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See HUTSON, supra note 52, at 176–82 (discussing the Court’s interpretation of the 
originalist perspective of the separation of church and state and why he views it as incorrect). 
 62. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–13 (1947). Note that the Supreme 
Court previously ruled that the First Amendment protections apply to action by state 
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
303 (1940). 
 63. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
 64. Id. (emphasis added). 
 65. See DEPT. OF STATE, 110TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 2006, at 730 (Joint Comm. Print 2007) (reporting, for example, on religious 
freedom in Iran and in Pakistan). 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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government and religion is inevitable, the First Amendment religion 
clauses are concerned with excessive entanglement.67 
In Walz v. Tax Commission,68 the Supreme Court evaluated 
whether a provision exempting church property from property tax 
found in the New York Constitution violated the Establishment 
Clause of the United States Constitution.69 First, the Court looked 
at the purpose of the exemption. It found that instead of attempting 
to advance or inhibit religion, New York had made a determination 
that certain organizations provide a benefit to the community that 
should not be hindered by taxation.70 
Second, the Court looked at the effect of the constitutional 
provision: if the effect of the provision is to create excessive 
entanglement between the government and religion, then the 
provision violates the religion clauses.71 In terms of tax relief, “[t]he 
exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between 
church and state and far less than taxation of churches,” serving to 
insulate churches from having a fiscal involvement with 
government.72 
The Court recognized that a tax on church property, on the 
other hand, “would tend to expand the involvement of government 
by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax 
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow 
in the train of those legal processes.”73 This involvement, however, 
would pale in comparison to the involvement the government would 
have if it imposed a blanket restriction on lobbying. Churches often 
 
 67. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (“No perfect or absolute 
separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of 
sorts—one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.”). 
 68. 397 U.S. 664. 
 69. Id. at 666–67. The religion clauses of the First Amendment, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, are applicable to the states. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 70. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672–73. 
 71. Id. at 674. 
 72. Id. at 676. The Court also uses the history of the non-taxation of churches and the 
lack of the establishment concerns to support its conclusion. Id. at 676–78. Note that this 
argument does not address that exemptions were originally given to established religions. 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption of Religious Organizations from Federal Taxation, in 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 409, 431 n.101 (James A. Serritella ed., 
2006) (quoting John Witte, Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid 
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 367 (1991)). 
 73. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. 
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“vigorous[ly] advoca[te] . . . legal [and] constitutional positions.”74 
As a church advocates a moral position that correlates with a political 
topic, the line between moral advocacy and political lobbying is 
blurred. An absolute prohibition would not take into account this 
reality.75 
Further, since even a minor violation under this approach would 
be intolerable, the IRS would need broad discretion in its church 
audits to prevent abuses. This broad discretion would pose 
constitutional concerns because going over church memos, 
questioning the intent of sermons, etc., would appear to create the 
excessive entanglement the First Amendment seeks to avoid. 
1. The UBIT example 
The need to avoid excessive entanglement is highlighted by the 
Unrelated Business Income Tax (“UBIT”). Congress has seen the 
need of auditing churches in the UBIT context and also has realized 
that certain protections are necessary. Congress enacted the UBIT in 
1950, taxing unrelated business net income of tax-exempt 
organizations,76 to address unfair competition between tax-exempt 
and taxable entities.77 In 1969, Congress broadened the tax, which 
originally did not apply to churches,78 to encompass all charitable 
organizations.79  
Upon broadening the UBIT, however, Congress realized that 
the auditing of churches raised several concerns and added a 
subsection to § 7605 that dealt with examining churches.80 When 
revisiting the issue in 1984, the Senate Finance Committee 
 
 74. Id. at 670. 
 75. While there is a blanket restriction on electioneering under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), 
violating this requirement is easier to avoid since a church leader, rather than speaking in 
generalities, must either endorse or oppose a candidate. 
 76. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (1952). 
 77. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 28 (1950). 
 78. 26 U.S.C. § 421(b)(1) (1950). 
 79. 26 U.S.C. § 511 (1969).  
 80. See 26 U.S.C. § 7605(c) (1970) (“No examination of the books of account of a 
church . . . shall be made to determine whether such organization may be engaged in the 
carrying on of an unrelated trade or business . . . unless the Secretary [so] believes. . .[,] so 
notifies the organization in advance of the examination[, and the] examination . . . shall be 
made [only]  to the extent necessary to determine the amount of tax imposed by this title.”). 
As a result of these concerns, Congress restricts inquiries into and examinations of churches. 
I.R.C. § 7611 (2006) (originally enacted in Tax Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1034). 
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highlighted some of these concerns. While realizing that the church 
form could be utilized to avoid taxes, and thus some oversight is 
needed, the committee noted that there is an issue with the 
“separation of church and state,” which is further “compounded by 
the relative inexperience of churches in dealing with the IRS and the 
resulting occasional misunderstandings between churches and the 
IRS.”81 The resulting Church Audit and Procedure Act limits the 
ability of the Service to audit churches by, for example, limiting the 
records that are necessary to complete an audit and limiting the 
amount of audits the Government can conduct.82 
IV. EVALUATING THE CURRENT APPROACH 
Unfortunately, the current approach to lobbying under § 
501(c)(3), while on its face giving churches some breathing room 
but not an unfettered ability to lobby under a substantiality 
requirement, is inadequate because of its ambiguity. This ambiguity 
presents both enforcement concerns for the IRS and the potential to 
hinder the free speech of churches. 
A. Enforcement Problems 
Under the current statutory approach, the IRS has trouble 
imposing a tax even if that activity is clearly substantial. Churches do 
not have to file a Form 1023 with the Service to receive tax-exempt 
status,83 nor do churches have to be registered in order for donors to 
take a charitable deduction on their tax returns.84 Donors and church 
members have little incentive to monitor church activities because 
the deductibility of their donations, under § 170, depends on the 
continuing application of a tax-exempt status. The IRS is thus left to 
rely on tips from third parties. 
The IRS also has little incentive to allocate the resources it has to 
regulating churches. Currently, there is an estimated tax gap of $300 
billion.85 Of that amount, $100 billion is estimated as collectible.86 
 
 81. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984: 
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, at 873 
(Comm. Print 1984). 
 82. See Gaffney, supra note 72, at 442. 
 83. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2006).  
 84. Internal Revenue Publication 526, at 2 (2008). 
 85. John McKinnon, White House Leans Toward Tighter Enforcement of Taxes, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A4. 
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The IRS would be better served by having security dealers report the 
purchase price of sold securities and by having credit card companies 
report the revenue of small restaurants.87 The IRS also is allocated 
funds that are invested “in high return-on-investment activities that 
generate improved compliance and fairness in the application of tax 
laws.”88 While revenue can be generated from evaluating church 
activities, auditing churches will likely not produce the return on 
investment that would result from prosecuting offshore tax shelters 
and regulating profitable corporations or wealthy taxpayers.89 
B. Uncertainty 
While some may argue that the ambiguity of the current 
approach provides an effective limit on religious interference with 
government,90 on the other hand, the approach may hinder the 
exercise of religious conviction. When churches are left guessing 
whether something is political or not, and as a result they refrain 
from that activity, they may be missing out on a valid opportunity. 
The difficulty in deciphering what is political and what is not reflects 
that in certain contexts, religious and political matters overlap. Thus 
while the wall between religion and state may be firm and high, it 
might not run along a straight line.91 While arguably all political and 
religious ideas are related, there are some that are so fundamental to 
religion, that although the legislation is clearly furthering its 
“charitable” mission, a church might not advocate its position in 
order to avoid the loss of its charitable status.  
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: 
RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 91 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf (budget for the fiscal year 2010).  
 89. The United States is currently pushing to require greater disclosure of U.S. funds 
deposited abroad. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp, Glenn Simpson & David Gauthier–Villars, 
U.S. Wants More Client Names from UBS, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A1.  
 90. Irrespective of how religion is kept out of politics, the majority of Americans now 
believe that religion should be kept out of politics. Some Social Conservative Disillusionment: 
More Americans Question Religion’s Role in Politics, THE PEW FORUM OF RELIGION AND 
PUBLIC LIFE (Aug. 21, 2008), available at http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=334. 
 91. For example, the government has seen the value of religion in promoting social 
programs by implementing a faith-based initiative. Initiated by President George W. Bush, 
President Barack Obama announced the continuance of a modified program on February 5, 
2009. David J. Wright, Taking Stock: The Bush Faith-Based Initiative and What Lies Ahead, 
THE ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. WELFARE POL’Y (2009). 
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Thus the current approach fails to provide much guidance to 
churches regarding when lobbying becomes too much lobbying. 
Because courts choose to look at the facts and circumstances of each 
case, churches are often left not testing the political water, unwilling 
to risk presenting a case that could be ripe for § 501(c) revocation. 
As an example of an unwillingness to risk negative repercussions, 
churches may read letters from the pulpit advising members that the 
church refrains from political activity.92 
This chilling effect of § 501(c)(3), welcome or not, goes beyond 
the original purpose of the provision. As discussed previously, the 
intent of the drafters was to inhibit the funneling of money through 
charities supporting legislation for the purpose of avoiding 
taxation.93 While in the context of churches there is the additional 
concern of the separation of church and state, an allowable amount 
of lobbying should not be muzzled by uncertainty.  
V. ALTERNATIVE TESTS 
While the current lobbying test under § 501(c)(3) could be 
modified to better address enforcement issues and to provide more 
certainty, it is not immediately clear what would be a better 
approach. Too much certainty provided by the IRS could spur 
avoidance, while an attempt to capture the actual lobbying activity of 
a church could create entanglement issues between church and state. 
A modified approach would ideally balance and address each of these 
concerns. 
A. Applying § 501(h) to Churches 
Currently, under § 501(h) of the Code, a § 501(c)(3) 
organization, but not a church,94 can elect to subject itself to a 
quantified test evaluating lobbying by filing a Form 5768.95 The 
organization can make up to $1 million in lobbying expenditures 
during a taxable year, based on a percentage test of expenditures for 
 
 92. Even though the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints became involved in 
Proposition 8, it attempted to limit that involvement, such as avoiding the use of buildings, 
and communicated this by letter. See Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in 
Ban of Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A1. 
 93. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 94. I.R.C. § 501(h)(3)(B) (2006). 
 95. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2006). 
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exempt purposes.96 This provision also gives an organization a 
reprieve if the organization exceeds its limitation during a single 
year; to cause revocation, the organization has to normally exceed 
the limitation,97 which the Treasury Regulations defines as exceeding 
150% of the limitation over a four-year period.98 
Congress precluded churches from the § 501(h) election upon 
the request of various churches.99 These churches believed that part 
of their mission encompassed legislative lobbying and did not want 
any explicit limitation put upon their freedom of speech right. Other 
churches that take the view that their mission does not include direct 
involvement in politics are also unlikely to accept the application of § 
501(h) to churches on the grounds that it would condone some 
level of political activity by churches.  
Whether or not desired by churches, the test inadequately 
addresses avoidance. Much of a church’s activities may not constitute 
cash outlays at all. A church would likely be further incentivized to 
influence legislation through means other than expenditures in order 
to avoid exceeding the statutory cap. And unlike other charitable 
organizations, the policing of a church is more difficult to impose 
because of the desire to avoid excessive entanglement that is 
prohibited by the separation of church and state under the First 
Amendment.100 
B. Modified § 501(h) 
As suggested recently by one commentator, instead of applying § 
501(h) directly to churches, Congress could take the basic premise 
of that subsection—the setting of a fixed line—and modify it to take 
into account not only actual expenditures, but also the intangible 
activities of a church.101 This test would take into account such 
intangibles as mailing lists and goodwill, and in theory would 
partially incorporate the “fairness” provided by § 501(h) while 
 
 96. I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(2)(B), 4911(c)(2) (2006). 
 97. I.R.C. § 501(h)(1) (2006). 
 98. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3(b)(1)(i) (2000). 
 99. Kim Bouchillon, Comment, Guiding Lobbying Charities into a Safe Harbor: Final 
Section 501(h) and 4911 Regulations Set Limits for Tax–Exempt Organizations, 61 MISS. L.J. 
157, 164 n.56 (1991). 
 100. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 101. See generally Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of 
Charities, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 370 (2009). 
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providing a clearer picture of all expenditures. 
1. Fairness 
Under a modified § 501(h) approach, churches appear to be on a 
level playing field; churches with very large expenditures cannot 
allocate a disproportionate amount, in dollar per dollar terms, as 
compared to a smaller church, which would otherwise allow the 
larger churches to wield great political influence.102 
But while it is argued that “[i]t is hard to see a good justification 
for [the current law that gives], in effect, . . . political influence to 
only the largest charities,”103 there appears a very good justification: 
the focus of the law is on promoting the activities of organizations 
that provide for the basic needs of society.104 Since the purpose of § 
501 is to provide an exemption for organizations that perform vital 
services to the American community that the government would 
otherwise have to provide; it follows that the limitation on lobbing 
should be secondary to that main concern. Shifting the focus from 
the primary purpose to a subsidiary purpose would allow the political 
tail to wag the charitable dog. 
Also, the need for a fixed limit on lobbying should not be 
inferred from the structure of § 501(h).105 While a charity cannot 
expend more than $1 million on lobbying under that subsection, 
that amount is the upper end of a sliding scale.106 The more an 
organization spends the more that organization can use for lobbying, 
up to $1 million.107 For example, an organization that expends 
$500,000 can only direct $100,000 of that amount towards 
lobbying.108 Thus, § 501(h) could be viewed as recognizing that the 
more expenditures an organization makes, e.g., the larger the 
organization is, the more that it can spend on lobbying.109  
 
 102. See id. at 370, 376. 
 103. Id. at 370. 
 104. See H.R. REP. NO. 75–1860, at 19 (1939). 
 105. Professor Galle argues that the $1 million limitation of § 501(h) implies that 
Congress intended to impose a fixed ceiling on lobbying. Galle, supra note 101, at 376. 
 106. See 26 U.S.C. § 4911(c)(2) (2006). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. A counterargument is that the sliding scale prevents a small organization from using 
100% of its expenditures on lobbying. If, however, the concern is on the size of a contribution, 
there should not be a concern with the percentage of expenditures going towards lobbying as 
long as those expenditures are being used in furtherance of a tax-exempt purpose. 
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More importantly, commentators recognize that § 501(h) 
provides a safe harbor for charities that supplements, not replaces, 
the prior § 501(c)(3) construction.110 Congress could have replaced 
the lobbying restriction of § 501(c)(3) but instead opted to provide 
an alternative test for charities—the test is optional, not mandatory. 
And despite an argument that a safe harbor test provides the most 
assurance to massive organizations that spend a large sum on 
lobbying,111 it in fact provides greater guidance to comparatively 
smaller organizations because an expenditure equal in size to that 
made by a larger organization would more likely trigger the 
substantial test for the smaller organization. For example, if an 
organization spent $1.5 million on lobbying in a year, there is little 
doubt that an organization that has total expenditures of $10 million 
would be in more need of guidance than a “massive organization” 
that spends the same in lobbying but has total expenditures of $100 
million to determine if that spending were substantial. 
Further, lobbying by churches is most often in line with their 
charitable purpose. The activities of large churches would be more 
concerning if they were funneling money and other activities into 
lobbying efforts with a primary focus on driving a political agenda. 
The organization in this case would be both serving as a church and 
a political machine, in which case, the concern should not be 
addressed through the lobbying requirement, but rather through the 
exclusivity requirement of § 501(c)(3).112   
Finally, under a bright-line test, large organizations would be 
incentivized to break up into several smaller organizations to avoid 
any spending limitation. Of course the IRS could react by imposing 
associational tests, looking at ownership and commonality in 
organizations, but once the line is drawn in the sand, the Service will 
always have to be one step ahead of a charity to continually prevent 
abuses. 
2. Clearer picture  
Apart from fairness concerns, an approach that is based on 
 
 110. Laura Chisholm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the 
Rationale, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 225–26 (1988). 
 111. Galle, supra note 101, at 376–77. 
 112. See discussion supra Part II comparing the exclusivity requirement to the lobbying 
restriction.  
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applying a fixed amount, like a § 501(h) test, could provide more 
clarity in evaluating lobbying activity.113 Allocation of actual 
expenditures, however, can prove difficult, and unfortunately, if a 
modification to § 501(h) is attempting to quantify intangibles such 
as volunteer work and goodwill of the organization, any clarity 
provided by § 501(h) is lost. 
One commentator argues that goodwill needs to be 
quantified.114 An example of such goodwill is when a leader of a 
church speaks to the members. Normally the associated costs would 
be calculated by looking at the value of the church’s resources, such 
as time, that were used to conduct the activity. That calculation, 
however, overlooks the fact that the message shared possesses value 
for the listeners that, if given to an unrelated party, would not have 
the same effect. The difference is that the effect of the message 
reflects goodwill.115 
Another intangible that may need to be measured is the value 
associated with any list a church uses to facilitate its lobbying 
efforts.116 For example, phone lists can be used to solicit help and 
donations. The IRS would normally only take into account the salary 
and overhead costs attributed to the time church staff used the list, 
but not the cost of preparing the list.117 In theory, part of that cost 
should be allocable to the lobbying efforts since the lobbying would 
not have occurred but for that unaccounted-for expenditure.  
Finally, another expenditure that may be overlooked is the 
volunteer work and donations of church members directly to a cause. 
For example, leading up to the vote on Proposition 8 in California, 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“LDS 
church”) spent time knocking on doors, calling neighbors, posting 
signs, and otherwise advertising support for the proposed change to 
the California Constitution. The IRS has taken the position that, 
under the § 501(c)(3) test, the time involved in such volunteer 
efforts should be considered in determining whether substantial 
lobbying has occurred, as should the costs to the organization of 
preparing the volunteers.118  
 
 113. See Galle, supra note 101, at 372–73. 
 114. See id. at 375. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 374.  
 117. Id. 
 118. 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-2(b)(4)(ii)(C) ex.8 (2008); IRS Pub. 1828, at 6 (2008). But 
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While taking the aforementioned expenditures into account 
would provide a more accurate picture of the lobbying of a church, 
such an approach obscures the clarity that a provision modeled after 
§ 501(h) should provide. For example, how will goodwill be 
measured? Financial accounting recognizes the difficulty of 
measuring goodwill in that it does not permit goodwill to be 
recognized as an asset in a company’s books unless the company is 
purchased and an excess is paid for the company. And even if the 
cost of an activity can be measured—such as the costs of producing 
lists—how is that cost to be allocated? If the church were a 
corporation that had terminated in the tax year in question, 
presumably one could find the total use of the lists and allocate the 
costs to produce the lists based on lobbying and non-lobbying use.119 
But since the church will also use the list in the future, an exact 
allocation of the costs to produce the lists would be impossible. 
Allocation of volunteer work would be equally problematic. 
First, unless a thorough record is maintained, it will be virtually 
impossible to determine the total amount of hours expended on 
lobbying efforts. If those hours could be determined, how would 
they be quantified? Under the current application of § 501(c)(3), the 
amount of time can be a factor in determining lobbying activity, but 
if this approach is revised to reflect the fixed approach of § 501(h), a 
conversion from time to dollars would be needed. Should that cost 
be what a church would have to pay someone to do the work? Or 
should it be the foregone salary of the individual performing the 
volunteer work? For example, if an attorney bills $250 per hour at 
her regular job, and she volunteers ten hours, should there be an 
allocation of $2,500 to the church’s lobbying efforts? 
The problem with allocating volunteer work is further 
compounded by the different capacities in which a church member 
can act. When a church member volunteers time or gives money to a 
cause, does he or she do so in the capacity of a representative of the 
church, or in the capacity of an individual concerned citizen? 
Determining which hat an individual wears is crucial in respecting 
 
the actual expenditures made by volunteers are not taken into account. 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-
2(b)(4)(ii)(C) ex.8 (2008). 
 119. Of course determining the total use would also be very burdensome. The IRS could 
operate under a presumption that the use was 100% for lobbying unless shown otherwise by 
the organization. In the case of a church, however, such a burden would be problematic under 
the Code and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
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freedom of speech and thus in correctly allocating costs. Some 
church members devote all of their time to their church and arguably 
all of their actions can be attributed back to the church. But most 
church members have full-time jobs outside of their church and do 
not devote their lives solely to church service.  
Also, the permissibility of evaluating these activities by a church 
is uncertain. While churches may be required to give an initial report 
of the expenditures made in a lobbying effort,120 the IRS is restricted 
under the Church Audit Procedures Act (“CAPA”) as to when, and 
to what extent, an audit can be made of churches. 
Even if the IRS could probe into the actual value of these costs, 
and if it in fact decided to spend the time and money investigating 
the matter, the IRS may not be justified in doing so. Members of the 
LDS church, for example, were estimated to have spent 
approximately $20 million in support of Proposition 8.121 Using this 
amount to evaluate whether a church violated a lobbying restriction 
would not, however, be in line with the fear that legislators had 
when Congress originally passed the lobbying restriction; namely, 
the funneling of money through a charity to influence legislation tax-
free.122 Those donations were after tax donations, and thus the 
government was not subsidizing any lobbying by allowing such 
donations to occur. 
Finally, if the goal is to prevent a § 170 deduction for lobbying 
efforts, a cogent rationale is also lacking for quantifying the value of 
volunteer work done in substitution of the giving of charitable 
contributions.123 Under no circumstances is the rendering of services 
 
 120. For example, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints had to report to the 
state of California expenditures made in support of Proposition 8. 
 121. Galle, supra note 101, at 373 (citing Jesse & Johnson, supra note 92, at A1). 
 122. See 73 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934) (statement of Sen. Reed). 
 123. Professor Galle cites the theory that lobbying should be limited because charitable 
deductions are more valuable to rich contributors to support his argument that there must be a 
more meaningful limitation on large charities. Galle, supra note 101, at 377. While this 
argument is viable to show that lobbying of charities in general should be limited, not only 
because of the higher after-tax benefit to the wealthy, but also because the wealthy are more 
able to donate, it does little to distinguish the giving between large and small charities. A small 
organization, for example, can get 100% of its donation from a patron that is taxed at the 
highest marginal rate, and thus who will get the highest maximum benefit for donating. 
Whereas a larger organization may get myriad donations that include donations from 
individuals at lower marginal rates. Professor Galle also applies a second theory to support his 
argument, one that supports a lobbying restriction to preserve the distinct spheres of 
government and charity. Id. This argument is more salient since there are set amounts that 
would impact politics, regardless of the size of the organization lobbying. 
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deductible for tax purposes under § 170.124 If volunteer work is 
contributed instead of cash, such work is not taking the place of an 
otherwise deductible payment, because a contribution to a lobbying 
effort would only be deductible if made in the form of a tangible 
outlay to the church. 
C. Percentage Test 
Instead of imposing a set dollar threshold, another alternative 
proposed in the past is the imposition of a set percentage test. On 
September 21, 2001, Representative Phillip Crane introduced H.R. 
2931, the “Bright-Line Act of 2001,” in the House of 
Representatives.125 Under Representative Crane’s bill, the 
“substantial part” lobbying test would be modified, prohibiting 
lobbying only if expenditures exceeding twenty percent of gross 
revenues.126 
While the bill never made it out of committee, the idea of a 
percentage test has been previously attributed to a pair of cases: 
Seasongood v. Commissioner127 and Haswell v. United States.128 These 
cases illustrate two different incidents of lobbying—one found to be 
an insubstantial activity, the other found to be substantial.129 
In Seasongood, the Sixth Circuit found that the substantiality 
requirement had not been violated where a § 501(c)(3) organization 
had exerted less than five percent of its time and effort to influence 
 
 124. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (2000) (“No deduction is allowable under section 170 
for a contribution of services.”). If, however, the individual makes a cash outlay to help 
perform the services, such as an expenditure for transportation costs, the related unreimbursed 
portion can be deducted. Id. This provision most likely addresses the administrative difficulty 
of taking into account imputed income. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 229 (3d ed. 2004). 
 125. 147 CONG. REC. 17,658 (2001); H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. (2001).  
 126. H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill defined gross revenues as the sum of 
gross income and aggregate contributions and gifts. Id. 
 127. 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955). 
 128. 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974). Some commentators believe these cases created a 
rough framework to determine whether lobbying activities are substantial.  
 129. Evaluating the percentage of expenditures on a certain activity has also been 
considered under the exclusivity requirement. In one case, the Tax Court found that 
expending ten percent of outlays on a non tax-exempt purpose did not violate the exclusivity 
requirement of § 501(c)(3). World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 967 (1983). The 
Tax Court also noted, however, that substantiality has to be evaluated “under the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case.” Id. 
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political activity.130 The organization’s Articles in Seasongood stated 
that the group had an educational purpose; namely to inform 
citizens of public health issues and to encourage participation in civic 
duties.131 The organization, however, also distributed materials 
urging action on legislation and encouraging support of certain 
candidates.132 
On the other end of the percentage spectrum, the United States 
Court of Claims found that expenditures used in an attempt to 
influence legislation that constituted over sixteen percent of total 
expenditures were substantial.133 In Haswell, the taxpayer started an 
organization focused on stemming the tide in the decline of 
passenger railroad service.134 While the organization attempted to 
influence the public through publications and speeches, it also 
initiated litigation against the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
gave direct testimony in front of congressional members, submitted 
writings to congressional committees, conducted informal meetings 
with members of Congress, and had an organization—the National 
Counsel Associates—meet with the Department of Transportation 
and the Interstate Commerce Commission to advocate on its 
behalf.135 In finding substantial lobbying, the court noted that 
17.04% and 16.6% of its expenditures in 1967 and 1968 respectively 
went towards political activity.136 
While a percentage test appears to provide greater certainty in 
evaluating the lobbying activities of a church, in reality, great 
ambiguity still exists. As the Tenth Circuit stated in Christian Echoes 
National Ministry v. United States, “[a] percentage test to determine 
whether the activities were substantial obscures the complexity of 
balancing the organization’s activities in relation to its objectives and 
circumstances.”137 The court in Haswell also recognized this 
complexity,138 and while it informed its decision with a percentage 
 
 130. Seasongood, 227 F.2d at 912. 
 131. Id. at 909. 
 132. Id. at 909–10. 
 133. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1146–48. 
 134. Id. at 1136. 
 135. Id. at 1137–39.  
 136. Id. at 1146. 
 137. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th 
Cir. 1972). 
 138. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1142. The court in Seasongood avoided any complexity by 
taking the taxpayer’s word at face value without actually evaluating what percentage of its 
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evaluation, the determination of the correct percentage in light of 
the organization’s circumstances appeared highly subjective. 
Although, for example, the court determined that the charitable 
organization expended 20.5% of its cash outflow on lobbying in 
1967, the government allocated 76.1% of the organization’s 
expenditures to lobbying.139 
Moreover, the court in Haswell looked strictly at cash 
expenditures. Lobbying efforts, however, can largely consist of 
volunteer efforts and other non-monetary activities.140 As highlighted 
above, it is difficult to quantify many of these activities for 
comparison purposes. And if a court is to look at the non-monetary 
activities of a church used for lobbying, the court should also look at 
the church’s total activities.141 In other words, in order to be fair and 
accurate, if the numerator takes into account non-monetary activities 
(i.e., lobbying activities) so should the denominator (i.e., total 
activities). But again, there would be difficulty in determining what 
proportion of the activities by a church member is done in an 
individual capacity and what proportion is done in the capacity as a 
representative of the church. 
Besides the complexity of quantifying these activities, an 
investigation attempting to discover a church’s cumulative activities 
would most likely lead to the type of excessive entanglement 
contemplated in Walz.142 
D. Involve the FEC 
Another possible approach that has been suggested is to involve 
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) in monitoring political 
activity.143 Unlike the IRS, which depends on third party referrals, 
“[t]he FEC already has procedures in place for dealing with 
 
expenditures actually constituted lobbying. See Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 
(6th Cir. 1955).  
 139. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1146. 
 140. See, e.g., IRS Pub. 1828, at 6 (2008). 
 141. While this is also a problem under a provision that is based on § 501(h), discussed 
previously, the percentage approach provides the additional complexity of attempting to 
determine the total amount of activity by a church. 
 142. See supra Part II.B.  
 143. See Kelly S. Shoop, Note, If You are a Good Christian You Have No Business Voting 
for this Candidate: Church Sponsored Political Activity in Federal Elections, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1927, 1946 (2005). 
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campaign finance regulations.”144 The FEC specifically regulates 
election activities, whereas the IRS has to deal with all situations 
regarding taxation. 
This approach may very well help in the campaigning context. 
Since § 501(c)(3) imposes a blanket restriction on supporting or 
opposing candidates, enhanced enforcement may adequately address 
campaigning concerns. The involvement of the FEC, or the 
providing of any resources to help the IRS, however, would only 
solve half of the equation. The agencies, and churches, would still be 
unclear on what “substantial” means.  
E. A New Approach 
A compromise test would place a threshold dollar amount on 
lobbying activities by churches. If that dollar threshold were crossed, 
the church, under § 6001, would have the burden to show that it 
merits tax-exempt status. 
1. Initial threshold 
First, the expenditure test by churches would look at actual 
expenditures, not intangibles. For example, airline travel and hotel 
stay, purchases of supplies, and advertising spots would be measured, 
but items such as the use of church lists and volunteer time would 
not.145 The threshold would have to be somewhat high so that it 
would not be easily violated, but low enough that a further analysis 
could be applied if necessary.146 The FEC, or a different organization 
besides the IRS, would evaluate whether the threshold had been 
crossed.147 The involvement of another agency could possibly resolve 
the problem of lack of resources that apparently plagues the IRS’s 
ability to regulate the activities of churches. 
Under state law, churches in various areas must already report 
their expenditures in funding measures aimed at influencing 
legislation. This self-reporting mechanism, if tailored to prevent easy 
 
 144. Id. at 1948. 
 145. Volunteer time and other factors can be taken into account once the threshold is 
crossed. 
 146. A possible weakness is that a small religious organization could theoretically use 
100% of its resources to influence legislation.  
 147. Some states require that a church report expenditures it made while attempting to 
influence legislation. This information, combined with an objective expenditure test, will 
alleviate the FEC of an otherwise insurmountable burden. 
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avoidance, also helps alleviate CAPA concerns. Then, if the 
government knew that the threshold had been passed, a green light 
could be given to conduct an audit (at least to a certain extent) of 
the church’s activities. 
Aside from serving a useful purpose to government agencies, a 
threshold dollar amount would allow churches that might not be 
engaging in political activities a safe harbor to exercise free speech 
rights. This amount will thaw a church’s inability to act that 
previously came from uncertainty on the consequences of its tax-
exempt status. 
While a dollar amount could potentially encourage the formation 
of small churches, and benefit existing churches, that does not mean 
that these churches could engage in political activity at will. First, an 
associational test could be used. Unfortunately, as previously 
mentioned, such a test would not catch all problems and would 
necessarily be reactionary in nature. A possible solution is a good-
faith test—any activity that demonstrates bad faith, untoward results, 
selfish motivation, or controversial effect would disqualify small 
churches from tax exemption.148  
2. Determination of substantiality once threshold has been crossed 
If the government agency working with the IRS were to find that 
lobbying activity crossed the threshold amount, the IRS would 
perform an audit. At such point, in its discretion, the IRS could 
choose not to challenge the tax-exempt status. The burden would be 
on the church to show that its political activities were insubstantial 
under all of the relevant facts and circumstances. Apart from the shift 
in the burden, this prong of the test would mirror the current 
approach. It would give relief to larger organizations that would 
more easily cross the initial expenditure threshold. But there are 
important distinctions between the current approach, and a 
threshold approach. For example, the threshold test would account 
for intangibles once the monetary threshold has been surpassed. 
While intangibles may have been recognized as relevant facts and 
circumstances under the old approach, a threshold approach would 
mandate a clearer picture of the lobbying.149 And since an attempt to 
 
 148. See Note, Income Tax Disadvantages of Political Activities, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 273 
(1957). 
 149. But an exact dollar figure does not have to be derived. 
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quantify the activity in monetary terms is unnecessary under this 
prong of the test, the earlier valuation concern is not implicated. 
Further, the concern of possible entanglement of church and state 
would be partially alleviated since the government would have a 
standard procedure as to when a church’s activities should be more 
closely scrutinized. In other words, such a scrutiny would occur only 
after a church had crossed the initial expenditure threshold. 
3. Possible weaknesses 
Arguably, an attack on the idea of providing certainty is that 
churches already appear to have the option of safely lobbying 
through § 501(c)(4) organizations and the use of PACs. This 
possible challenge to the need for an alternative approach, however, 
can be addressed by considering the difficulty a church has in 
operating under this paradigm. For example, the PAC cannot be 
controlled by the church and the donations to it must be distinct 
from those made to the church in order to determine to what 
donations § 170 applies. 
Another possible weakness is that the threshold test could result 
in an equal protection violation. For example, there might be a 
violation if this provision is applicable to churches, but not to other 
charities. To the extent that this concern would actually exist, it can 
be eliminated by applying the same treatment to both churches and 
other charities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In a political atmosphere rife with issues of moral concern, 
churches must decide whether to become politically involved 
through lobbying. Churches must first realize that even if their 
political lobbying is done to further a tax-exempt purpose, the 
government can still scrutinize such activity for tax purposes. At the 
same time—in light of a church’s legitimate concern in the moral 
issues of a society—the government should nonetheless provide 
churches with a level of certainty so that they are not politically 
muzzled.  
An ideal lobbying test would provide a threshold safe-harbor 
figure, while at the same time avoiding the imposition of a significant 
burden on the church that would create excessive entanglement. 
Therefore, Congress, or the Treasury, should enact a test that takes 
into account all of the activities of a church while allowing larger 
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